

# **SIDC OPSCOM Report**

## **Cancellation of the Intraday Auction IDA1 for Delivery Date 16/04/2026**

16.04.2026

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# 1. SIDC Intraday Auctions

Single Intraday Coupling (SIDC) operates a single EU-wide cross-zonal intraday electricity market, complemented by three Intraday Auctions (IDAs) that enhance efficiency and provide accurate price signals for scarce cross-border capacity. The map below shows the European countries participating in IDAs.



For more information, please visit the [ENTSO-E](#) and [NEMO Committee](#) websites.

## 1.1 Normal Process and Timings

Intraday Auctions occur several times per day, each with a predefined Order Book Gate Closure Time (OBK GCT). Twenty minutes before this closure, cross-zonal capacity allocation through

Intraday Continuous Trading (IDCT) is suspended. This pause allows TSOs to update capacities based on the latest calculations and provide the necessary Cross-Zonal Capacities and Allocation Constraints for the auction.


At OBK GCT, NEMOs exchange these capacities and constraints across their systems and begin transferring Order Books to the central NEMO systems operating the Intraday Auction. Once all Order Books are received, the coupling process starts, taking into account the provided capacities and constraints.

After the auction results are generated, NEMOs validate them and make them available to TSOs via the SIDC Capacity Management Module for verification and allocation of Cross-Zonal Capacity on relevant bidding zone borders.

Once this window closes, cross-border continuous trading automatically reopens, and any possible incomplete Intraday Auction process is automatically cancelled. This report explores the circumstances and implications of such cancellations.


## MCSC Daily Timeline

### SDAC – SIDC – IDA daily timeline



## SIDC/IDA Timeline – Coupling Timing 15:00 / 22:00 / 10:00 CE(S)T

### IDA timeline



<b>IDA 1</b>	<b>14:40</b>	<b>14:45</b>	<b>15:00</b>	<b>15:20</b>
<b>IDA 2</b>	<b>21:40</b>	<b>21:45</b>	<b>22:00</b>	<b>22:20</b>
<b>IDA 3</b>	<b>09:40</b>	<b>09:45</b>	<b>10:00</b>	<b>10:20</b>

## 1.2 Incident Management Process

An incident is defined as an unwanted event occurring within the SIDC IDA systems, the local NEMO or TSO systems connected to SIDC IDA, or the communication channels linking them. An incident that requires convening an Incident Committee (IC) call has the following characteristics: the issue(s) cannot be resolved through a (Local) Backup procedure and may result in breaching a SIDC deadline.

Operational parties have agreed to follow the incident management procedure for handling such incidents. This procedure assumes that communication with relevant third parties (e.g., CCP, Shipping Agent, Explicit Participants) is managed by the involved TSOs and NEMOs according to their local processes.

As a general principle, the Incident Management procedure defines how incidents are addressed. This includes the operation of the Incident Committee (IC) and the application of measures such as closing and reopening interconnectors, restarting markets or delivery areas, suspending trading services, executing corresponding local procedures, and exchanging files in backup mode.

When an incident impacts any Single Intraday Market Coupling process, an Incident Committee (IC) must be convened by the IC SPOC or the IDA Coordinator. Participants in the IC identify the issue(s), assess the situation, and agree on potential solutions. The IC SPOC or IDA

Coordinator records all relevant information, including incident details, discussions, and decisions made during the IC call.

At the start of the IC call, the IC SPOC, the incident reporter, or the IDA Coordinator presents the issue. The parties review actions already taken by the affected party and agree on immediate measures. They also ensure correct classification of the incident, particularly for XBID-related cases.

The IC discusses potential solutions, including recommendations from the service provider where necessary. Once a solution is agreed upon, the parties decide on its implementation. The IC also determines the appropriate communication to market participants.

Typically, within two hours after the IC call concludes, the IC SPOC or IDA Coordinator prepares and finalizes the IC report and shares it with all NEMOs and TSOs. The involved parties review and update the report as needed. For IDCT issues affecting IDAs, the IC SPOC prepares the report; for IDA issues affecting IDCT, the IDA Coordinator is responsible.

## 2. Incident Description

This report informs stakeholders of an incident affecting the Intraday Auction 1 on 15/04/2026, resulting in IDA cancellation. The incident occurred due to a failure of IDA CIP (Intraday Auction Central Interface Point), which was caused by wider server issues of the IDA CIP host. The issue was not resolved until after IDA 2, also causing that auction to be canceled.

### 2.1 Course of Events

At approximately 14:40, the NEMO IDA coordinator observed irregularities within the IDA CIP environment. The system was experiencing degraded performance and appeared to have lost connectivity with XBID. Given that IDA CIP is a critical component for the execution of the Intraday Auctions (IDAs), an Incident Committee was convened shortly thereafter.

At the scheduled times, no capacity data was received in IDA CIP, and the system continued to remain largely unresponsive.

### 2.2 Timeline

Event	Start	End
<b>Incident occurrence.</b>	15/04/2026 - 14:40	
<b>NEMO IDA Coordinator noticed irregularities in IDA CIP (Intraday Auction Central Interface Point).</b>	15/04/2026 - 14:40	
<b>Incident Committee Started .</b>	15/04/2026 - 14:44	
<b>Joint Allocation Office (JAO) sent capacities through backup channels, IDA CIP</b>	15/04/2026 - 14:47	

<b>was unable to process this file.</b>		
<b>IDA 1 was cancelled as capacities could not be provided to NEMOs.</b>	15/04/2026 – 15:00	
<b>JAO confirmed that the IDA session was cancelled in CMM.</b>	15/04/2026 – 15:01	
<b>IC Closed .</b>		15/04/2026 – 15:15

## 2.3 Incident Cause

The host of the IDA CIP had underlying server issues which prevented the system from being used. A connection level issue was caused by excessive retransmission of data which overloaded the servers and had a significant effect on performance. This retransmission occurred as the servers did not receive adequate acknowledgement that information had been received. In effect this communication issue spiraled into a server overload issue, as the servers kept trying to retransmit information. This was related to the migration of the relevant virtual machines between IDA 3 & 1.

## 2.4 Impacted NEMOs, Bidding Zones and Bidding Zone Borders

### Impacted NEMOs:

EMCO (Nord Pool), EPEX, HEnEx, OMIE, OPCOM, GME, OTE, TGE.

### Impacted Bidding Zones:

All.

### Impacted Bidding Zone Borders:

All.

### 3. Mitigation Measures And Lessons Learnt

To ensure successful restoration of the operations and prevent the issue from happening again, the following measures have been taken:

**Short-term Solution by Affected Party** On IDA CIP host side: Disabling TCP checksum offloading to lower retransmission rates.

<b>Long-term Measures by Affected Party</b>	<p>The IDA CIP host did not provide any long-term measures.</p>
<b>SIDC Project Lessons Learned</b>	<p>The incident has underlined the importance of further strengthening the resilience of the IDA CIP setup. As a long-term mitigation measure, the existing architecture should be reviewed to identify potential single points of failure and to assess appropriate backup or contingency arrangements to enhance operational continuity.</p> <p>In addition, there is an opportunity to improve monitoring and communication processes. Enhanced proactive monitoring, earlier automated detection, and a clear escalation and communication framework should be established to ensure incidents are identified, communicated, and addressed promptly.</p>